







Abstract (not to be included in print version for metadata only): Given all that we have 
learned about bias and injustice, what can we do—and what should we do—to fight back? 
Chapter 12 introduces empirically-tested interventions for combating implicit (and explicit) bias 
and promoting a fairer world, from small daily-life debiasing tricks to larger structural 
interventions. Along the way, this chapter raises a range of moral, political, and strategic 
questions about these interventions, and stresses the importance of admitting that we don’t yet 
have all the answers. We must encourage intellectual humility and dedicate ourselves to gathering 
as much knowledge as possible. 
 
 
Changing the world is hard. Changing it for the better is usually harder than changing it for the 
worse. But why is positive change so difficult? Some answers are familiar. First, it’s hard to get 
people to care, especially about problems in different places (physically or socially distant 
neighborhoods or countries) that don’t confront us every day. Second, people are, 
understandably, wrapped up in pursuing personal goals (careers, families, hobbies). Third, and 
closely related to the first two reasons, many people feel like their votes and voices don’t matter 
because the system is rigged (by corporate donors, gerrymandered voting districts, etc.) to make 
their political efforts pointless. Fourth, making change to promote equality is especially hard, 
because the haves are typically motivated to hold onto their advantages, and even to see their 
advantages as fair. Even the have-nots are easily hoodwinked into thinking that their 
disadvantages are fair when they’re not (Jost, 2015). We derive comfort from believing we live 
in a merit-based society where, as long as you work hard enough, put your head down, and don’t 
rile up political trouble, then your personal and professional life will go well. Fifth, people may 
2 
 
perceive that the world is so big, the problems so entrenched, and here I am, just a tiny, 
insignificant individual. How can I possibly make a difference?  
This chapter helps to address such obstacles. But there’s another reason why changing the 
world is so hard: we often don’t know how to do it. After learning about implicit bias and related 
social ills, many people are persuaded that there is a problem, but they don’t know what to do 
next. This chapter is meant to start chipping away at these knowledge gaps, to provide concrete 
tools to become less biased on an individual level, as well as to start thinking about potential 
larger-scale reforms for combatting bias, discrimination, and injustice—for promoting a fairer 
world.  
But we shouldn’t oversell what we know. Another aim of this chapter is to highlight 
remaining gaps in our knowledge, and encourage you, the reader, to do your part to fill them. 
True progress requires that we adopt an experimental mindset: test out different strategies and 
see how they go, then go back to the drawing board, revise our strategies, and test them again. 
By contrast, people concerned about racism, sexism, and other forms of bias and discrimination 
sometimes speak as if the changes we need to make are obvious. They’re not. Consider two 
examples. 
 
1. Two Examples  
Boxed Out 
In the United States, we make it really hard for people with criminal records to get back, 
and stay on, their feet. One challenge is that many employers can, or sometimes must (by law), 
ask all applicants to “check a box” saying whether they have a criminal record. Asking ex-
offenders to self-identify in job applications seems reasonable from the perspective of employers 
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(especially for certain jobs: maybe I don’t want to hire someone convicted of decades of 
accounting fraud to be my accountant). But the result is that ex-offenders have a very hard time 
finding gainful employment, which in turn makes them more likely to become desperate to make 
ends meet, and then to re-offend and end up back in prison.  
Some ex-offenders have it worse than others. In one field study in Milwaukee, the odds 
of getting a callback for an interview were 34% for white male applicants with no criminal 
record but only 17% for white men with a criminal record. Moreover, the odds were 14% for 
black male applicants without a record, but only 5% for black men with a record (Pager, 2003). 
The first finding to note is that white men with a record had slightly better odds than black men 
without. Two follow-up studies in New York City found much the same: white applicants who 
had literally just gotten out of prison were slightly more likely to get a callback or job offer than 
black and Latinx applicants with spotless records (Pager et al., 2009). These studies illustrate 
how devastating a criminal record can be for anyone’s job prospects, but especially for people of 
color. 19 out of 20 ex-offenders of color can’t make it past the initial screening, even just to land 
an interview, let alone secure the job. 
This strikes many of us as unfair. Haven’t these folks already paid their debt to society? 
But even if you don’t find this unfair (maybe you think they “should have thought of that before 
committing the crime”), you might agree that the current system is counterproductive when it 
comes to reducing recidivism. We all share the goal of living safe from violence and crime, and 
many folks from both the left and right agree that much about the current criminal justice system 
makes ex-offenders of all races more rather than less likely to re-offend (Bibas, 2015).  
So what should we do about it? While the causes and remedies are complex, one intuitive 
piece of the puzzle is to restrict employers’ ability to demand that applicants “check the box.” 
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Recent “Ban the Box” initiatives have prohibited employers from asking about applicants’ 
criminal record until after they get past the initial screening process. As of April 2019, 35 states 
and over 150 cities have adopted some form of ban-the-box policy (Avery, 2019). It has been 
encouraging to see these steps being taken, but the results may not be what we were hoping for. 
One study compared employment rates in regions before and after banning the box 
(Doleac and Hansen, 2016), and found that low-skilled black and Latinx men were marginally 
less likely to be employed after banning the box than before. It might be that banning the box 
reduces discrimination against ex-offenders overall but increases discrimination specifically 
against applicants of color with clean records. Why might this be? Maybe because when 
employers cannot ask upfront about criminal histories, they may (consciously or unconsciously) 
just assume that black and brown applicants have sketchy backgrounds. The researchers point to 
“a growing literature showing that well-intentioned policies that remove information about 
negative characteristics can do more harm than good” (9).  
In response to such findings, what is an advocate for justice to do? Are we “damned if we 
do and damned if we don’t?” Before drawing such pessimistic conclusions, we should take a step 
back and begin by admitting that we don’t already know the best ways to address such problems. 
We should invest resources in studying the questions of how to facilitate ex-offender’s reentry 
into public life, rather than patting ourselves on the back for making a small change that sounds 
good in the abstract but maybe does little to fix things, and might even make matters worse.  
Anticipating these counterproductive results, Michelle Alexander wrote that, “banning 
the box is not enough. We must also get rid of the mind-set that puts black men ‘in the box’ 
(Alexander, 2012, p. 153; cf. Hernandez, 2017). It’s not enough to change rules and policies; we 
must also consider what’s going on in the minds of employers who consider applications from 
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ex-offenders, namely, stereotypes and prejudices about people of color. We must, collectively, 
overcome the mindsets (the feelings, assumptions, and implicit and explicit biases) that “box 
out” people of color from equal opportunities. 
 
Leaving mothers behind 
Upon first entering the workforce, men and women typically earn similar salaries. As 
their careers progress, that changes. Gradually, men’s paychecks tend to grow significantly 
higher than women’s. Men are also more likely to be promoted; in fact, women make up only 
5% of the CEOs of the 500 largest US corporations (Zarya, 2018). One of the most significant 
factors here is parenthood. Women who become mothers tend to fall behind, whereas men who 
become fathers often do even better than men who don’t become fathers (Aravena, 2015; Cudd, 
2006, chap. 5; Miller, 2014; see also Lisa and Larry example in Ayala-López and Beeghly, 
Chapter 11, "Explaining Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals"). (Parenthood is 
not the only factor behind the gender pay gap. Even if you compare single, childless men to 
single, childless women with comparable performances in comparable jobs, men still average 
about 5% higher salaries than women (e.g. Stewart and Valian, 2018, chap. 4). Also note that 
effects like the “fatherhood pay bonus” are strongest for high-skilled, cis straight white 
biological fathers married to biological mothers (Killewald, 2013; cf. Gasdaglis and Madva, 
Manuscript). There is some evidence for “breadwinner bonuses” and “caregiver penalties” in less 
gender-stereotypical parenting contexts (Bear and Glick, 2017), but a striking Norwegian study 
found that for same-sex couples, any pay gaps between parents due to having a child disappear 
within a few years (Andresen and Nix, 2019).) 
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What should we do about these gaps? Again, the causes and remedies here are complex. 
Much attention goes to family-friendly policies, such as allowing more flexible work schedules 
(Kliff, 2017), but especially to parental leave policies. Maybe if we give new parents more paid 
time off from work, then mothers will be less likely to fall behind. In fact, the US is the only 
developed country that doesn’t guarantee paid leave for parents. Some employers opt to give 
mothers a few months of paid leave, but many don’t. The US at least guarantees all parents 12 
weeks of unpaid leave (although, of course, only parents who are not living paycheck-to-
paycheck will be able to afford and take advantage of this policy). 
As with Banning the Box, however, attempts to reform leave policies may have 
unintended negative consequences. To take a simple example, requiring employers to let women 
take maternity leave might make them less likely to hire women at all, or to promote them up the 
ranks. Consciously or unconsciously, perhaps they would rather not be on the hook for hiring or 
promoting a woman who (they assume) can just leave the job for months on end, when they 
could instead hire a man who (they assume) will continue working without significant 
interruption. One study looked at employment and promotion rates for women before and after 
the US passed its minimal policy guaranteeing unpaid leave (Thomas, 2016), finding that women 
overall became a little more likely to remain employed (i.e., to not be fired or quit), but a little 
less likely to get promotions, perhaps because employers were reluctant to make investments in 
early-career women who they feared wouldn’t stick around. “The problem ends up being that all 
women, even those who do not anticipate having children or cutting back in hours, may be 
penalized,” said Thomas in an interview (Miller, 2015). 
Moreover, if mothers are being financially supported to take time off from work, but 
fathers are not, then fathers are going to stay on the job and have more time to move up the ranks 
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while new mothers lose experience, lose opportunities for promotion, and fall behind their male 
counterparts. The natural solution, then, would seem to be to encourage paternity leave in 
addition to maternity leave. Accordingly, Iceland includes 13 weeks of paid leave specifically for 
the non-childbearing parent, and most fathers take advantage of it (Kliff, 2018a). (Note that this 
policy is also more inclusive for gender-nonconforming parents.) Due to this and other 
aggressive efforts, Iceland has one of the lowest gender pay gaps in the world. They haven’t 
eliminated the gap completely (still hovering around 5%!), partly because mothers tend to take 
more leave than fathers (Bershidsky, 2018).  
But even completely gender-neutral parental benefits might not solve the problem. 
Everything depends on what parents do with the time set aside for caregiving. One study looked 
specifically at how certain gender-neutral parenting policies affected the odds of getting tenure 
for professors at 50 top-tier economics departments (Antecol et al., 2018). They found that some 
policies actually increased fathers’ advantages over mothers, evidently because new fathers used 
the extra time to work on their research and strengthen their case for tenure, whereas mothers 
actually used (needed) the time to recover, breastfeed, and parent.  
You can lead a horse to water but you can’t make it drink. Maybe you can lead a father to 
the home but you can’t make him parent. Or, much as Alexander said about ban-the-box 
campaigns, parental leave policies are not enough; we need to get rid of the mindsets that put one 
parent in the “breadwinner” box and the other in the “caregiver” box. We need to eliminate the 
conscious and unconscious expectations, habits, and preferences that treat fathers and mothers 
differently even when official laws and policies say they should be treated the same. Recall that 
whereas mothers are often paid less than childless women, fathers are typically paid more than 
childless men. One field study found that, even when their résumés were otherwise identical, 
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mothers were half as likely as childless women to be called back for an interview, whereas there 
was no penalty for fathers (Correll et al., 2007). Why might that be? Well, getting married and 
becoming a dad often strikes people as “responsible,” sending the message that you’ll be fully 
committed to your job because you need to support your family. By contrast, becoming a mom 
often sends the opposite message: employers think you are not fully committed to the job 
because you’re going to take time off to take care of the kids. This is unfair nonsense. Most 
mothers work, and they are presumably just as committed to supporting their family as working 
fathers. And nearly two-thirds of fathers believe they should be spending more time with their 
children (Parker and Livingston, 2018). 
There are also social pressures. Fathers who take full advantage of parental leave are 
sometimes seen as failing to live up to their stereotypical breadwinning role, whereas mothers 
who don’t take advantage of all their parental leave are sometimes seen as failing to live up to 
their stereotypical caregiving role. In fact, over 25% of both men and women worldwide (and 
over 20% of men in North America) explicitly believe that women should stay home altogether 
(Gallup-International Labour Organization, 2017). On top of that, nearly half of American 
women think they should both work outside the home and maintain primary caregiving and 
housework responsibilities. (And remember that housework is work, even though it’s often 
uncompensated and excluded from standard measures of economic output.) 
Reforming parental leave policies won’t—all by itself—dislodge all these biased beliefs 
and attitudes. Instead, dislodging biased attitudes may be essential to encouraging individual 
fathers to take full advantage of these policies and take on their fair share (i.e., half) of household 
responsibilities, as well as to expanding support for the sorts of powerful policy changes that 
Icelanders and others have explored. In other words, we need interventions specifically aimed at 
9 
 
changing individual hearts, habits, and minds, which may in turn be integral to bringing about 
necessary larger-scale social transformations and to ensuring that these transformations have the 
broadest and most durable impact on people’s lives. 
 
2. Either/or versus Both/and 
What examples like Boxed Out and Leaving Mothers Behind come to is an argument for 
insisting on the importance of individual-level debiasing strategies, which change individuals’ 
biased assumptions, feelings, and habits, including their implicit and explicit social prejudices 
and stereotypes. These examples help to respond to an important criticism of the debiasing 
strategies we’ll explore in this chapter, which is that they overlook more fundamental structural 
factors.  
What are structural factors? The contrast is with individual factors. As Brownstein 
(Chapter 3, “Skepticism About Bias”) and Ayala-López and Beeghly (Chapter 11, “Explaining 
Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals”) explain, different theorists draw the 
distinction between “individuals” and “structures” in different ways, but, to keep things simple 
here, we can think of structures as the contexts in which individuals operate. Individuals make 
choices, but they don’t decide what the available options are. The range of available options, and 
how attractive or feasible each option is—that’s part of the structure. Fathers in both Iceland and 
the US can choose to spend 13 weeks at home with their newborn. However, fathers in Iceland 
will be paid during that time, whereas fathers in the US will most likely not, and instead could be 
fired for being gone so long (past 12 weeks). Individuals have agency, the freedom to make 
choices, but it’s the external context, or structure, that shapes which options are more or less 
available, feasible, and desirable. 
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Structures include all sorts of things, most obviously rules, procedures, and laws. They 
also include informal social norms and our physical and social environments. Communities of 
color are, for example, more likely to be exposed to environmental toxins than predominantly 
white communities (Ard, 2015). Consider Flint, Michigan. The water source for this 
predominantly black city was changed in 2014, which in turn exposed thousands of adults and 
children to lead poisoning (Clark, 2018). Being poisoned just by turning on the tap was a feature 
of their structure, part of the system in which they operated (and against which they protested, 
although authorities repeatedly insisted there was nothing to worry about). Other structural 
factors include the availability and affordability of high speed internet, public transportation, 
housing, childcare, and healthcare. 
Roughly, structuralists argue that, when it comes to bringing about a more just society, 
we should deemphasize changing individual hearts and minds (think less about implicit bias, 
individual psychology, and ethics) and reemphasize changing structures (think more about 
sociology, urban planning, political philosophy, etc.). This means revising everything from social 
norms, to official laws, to the layout of physical space, to the broader systems governing how 
politicians are elected and how money and resources are extracted, generated, and distributed. 
I am all in favor of overhauling existing social structures. In fact, basically everybody is! 
Disagreement revolves around about which structures to change, and how. Libertarians and 
anarchists want fewer laws and regulations; their opponents want more. Both want structural 
change, but they disagree about which. But let’s grant structuralists the point that, for example, 
reforming family-friendly policies—like parental leave, work hour flexibility, and more 
affordable, accessible childcare—is necessary. We can also grant (just for the moment, for the 
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sake of argument) that these structural reforms will do more to promote fairness than combating 
individuals’ stereotypes about gender, careers, and caregiving. 
Does it follow that we should prioritize these structural reforms in general over changes 
in individual psychology in general? I don’t see how (Madva, 2016). Bringing about these policy 
changes requires, at a minimum, changes in the beliefs, motivations, or actions of those 
individuals poised to help change policy. Such structural reforms are more likely if the relevant 
individuals are persuaded that the reforms are possible and desirable, and start acting to help 
bring the reforms about. Such reforms are more likely to “stick” and change behavior in enduring 
ways insofar as the individuals affected “buy into” them, or at least don’t actively resist them (as 
in the case of employers and coworkers who think worse of fathers who take paternity leave). 
The most this sort of example can show, if it were correct, is that changing certain individual 
attitudes (in this case, stereotypes and personal preferences regarding gender, careers, and 
caregiving) is less relevant to bringing about necessary structural reform, and therefore to 
promoting fairness, than is changing other individual attitudes (e.g., changing individuals’ 
motivation to reform parental leave policies!).  
But note that for this example to make sense, we must also assume that individuals’ 
attitudes about gender, careers, and caregiving exert no meaningful influence on their beliefs and 
motivations surrounding the reform of parental leave policies. That is an implausible assumption. 
Changing individuals’ gender biases might very well be integral to drumming up support for 
reforming parental leave policies. Remember how many men and women alike still think 
mothers should stay at home or, even if working outside the home, still do the brunt of the 
homemaking? If views like these remain pervasive, how can we expect to generate enough 
enthusiasm and buy-in to make meaningful and durable changes to parenting policies? The 
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fundamental reason that it doesn’t make sense to say things like, “don’t worry about individuals’ 
prejudices and stereotypes, just focus on changing structures,” is that individuals’ prejudices and 
stereotypes are some of the most powerful factors shaping their willingness to support (or 
oppose) political and structural change (Azevedo et al., 2019; Cooley et al., 2019; Harell et al., 
2016; Monteith and Hildebrand, 2019; Mutz, 2018). 
3. More Lessons 
With this in mind, the next sections recommend concrete strategies for combating implicit (and 
explicit) bias at both the individual and structural levels. But I want to make a few more points 
about Boxed Out and Leaving Mothers Behind first. What also becomes clear in these examples 
is that we don’t yet know the best ways to address these problems. We need to study how to 
facilitate ex-offender’s reentry into public life, and how to avoid penalizing mothers for working 
and fathers for caregiving. Too often we revise our policies with the expectation that they’ll 
make a difference but then don’t bother to check if they’re helping or hurting (Dobbin et al., 
2015). What’s worse, even when policy changes don’t make any positive difference, they can 
still give members of privileged groups the false impression that others are now being unfairly 
advantaged over them, leading them to become more discriminatory toward the disadvantaged 
than they were before (Dover et al., 2014; Kaiser et al., 2013). 
So for starters, we need a healthy dose of epistemic humility when it comes to thinking 
about how to remedy social injustice (Medina, 2012; McHugh and Davidson, Chapter 9, 
"Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias"). Humility means not overestimating how good you 
are at something, calibrating your level of confidence to your level of ability. Calling for 
epistemic humility, then, is a warning against overestimating how much we know, to be less 
arrogant and self-assured that the solutions to these problems are obvious. 
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The difficulty of fixing these problems also reveals how multifaceted they are. There is 
never a single law or stereotype or powerful individual solely to blame. We must figure out how 
the many puzzle pieces fit together, and then attack these problems in an accordingly 
multifaceted way. We must reject the forced choice: either pay attention to individuals or pay 
attention to structures. Resist that either/or framing and insist on a both/and framing. We should 
think about the complex ways that individuals fit into their structures, and how to change both 
individuals and structures in tandem to promote fairness (e.g., how to simultaneously undermine 
stereotypes and overturn discriminatory laws, norms, and built environments). 
Relatedly, another lesson regards the importance of adopting an experimental approach to 
these issues. Since we can’t know in advance what will work, we have to put interventions in 
place with every intention of testing them, and then going back to the drawing board if they don’t 
work. What makes this so challenging is that collective motivation to change is usually a 
transient phenomenon: a crisis happens, then a bunch of changes are put in place, and then 
people forget about it—regardless whether the changes actually make things better or worse. Our 
initial plans have to include sub-plans to measure effects and re-assess. We need automatic 
checkpoints and triggers to determine whether our efforts are paying off.  
Given our epistemic limitations and the multifaceted nature of these problems, when we 
try to make changes, we shouldn’t put all our eggs in one basket. We should try out a bunch of 
things. We need what I call a diversified experimentalism (Madva, 2019a). If you’re saving for 
retirement, investors say you shouldn’t put it all in one company’s stock, because that company 
might go bankrupt. Instead, you should diversify your investments across a bunch of companies. 
We should similarly diversify our experimental portfolio, and explore a bunch of different 
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individual and social experiments and interventions to see which ones stick and which ones 
stink. 
 With these lessons in mind, what follows are strategies that—according to one person in 
2019—have enough evidential support to be worth a try. Future evidence might finetune, enrich, 
or even overturn the suggestions to follow. Here are some questions for you to think about for 
each strategy. First, most of these will work better in some contexts than others, and sometimes 
they might even backfire. Sorting out when and when not to use these tools is incredibly 
important—something for us to test in formal scientific settings as well as in the labs of lived 
experience. Ask yourself when these might be more useful, when they might be less useful, and 
when they might be downright ill-advised. Second, although these tools are framed in terms of 
what we as individuals can do, you can also consider how we might redesign our social 
institutions to encourage everybody to try them (a question we’ll investigate further in §5, on 
structural reform). Third, ask yourself how these tools might be usefully combined. Perhaps we 
can couple different techniques together to make them more powerful (for more on the 
importance of mutually reinforcing strategies, see Madva, 2016, 2017,  2019b)? 
 
4. Six Debiasing Tools 
Tool #1. The Life-Changing Magic of If-Then Plans 
 
The first debiasing tool regards how to bridge the gap between intention and action. This tool is 
if-then plans (their official name is a mouthful: “implementation intentions”). These are concrete 
plans that specify when, where, or how we intend to put our broader aims and values into 
practice. The key idea is that we are more likely to follow through on our goals if we focus as 
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concretely as possible on the contexts for action and the specific thoughts and behaviors we will 
execute in those contexts. To get a sense of the difference between vague and concrete plans, 
contrast the first with the second plan in each of these two pairs: 
 
1a. I’d like to cut back on smoking! 
 




2a. My New Year’s resolution is to work out more! 
 
2b. When I leave work on Tuesdays, then I will go to the gym! 
 
Which of these plans do you think will be more effective? 1a or 1b? What about 2a vs. 2b? Note 
that in each of these pairs, the first option just vaguely identifies the broad goal you’re aiming 
for, but it doesn’t say anything about how you intend to follow through on it. By contrast, the 
second option (step 1) identifies the specific contexts and obstacles that you’re interested in and 
(step 2) highlights a concrete, straightforward plan about what to do in those contexts. Research 
suggests that if-then plans are easy to form (practice rehearsing them in your head a few times, or 
write them down), easy to remember, and easy to execute in the crunch. Meta-analyses 
consistently find that they can have dramatic effects on behavior and goal achievement 
(Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Toli et al., 2016). 
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 If-then plans can be applied in pretty much any area of our lives where we recognize a 
gap between how we think we should act and how we actually do act. They are most studied in 
clinical settings related to healthy eating and substance use, but they also help combat implicit 
bias (Mendoza et al., 2010; Stewart and and Payne, 2008). For example, do you worry that you 
interrupt women more than men? Well, here’s an if-then plan for you: “If she’s talking, then I 
won’t!” Do you sometimes suffer from stereotype threat or test anxiety? Before your next exam, 
mentally rehearse the following if-then plan, studied by Bayer and Gollwitzer (2007): “And if I 
start a new problem, then I will tell myself: I can solve it!”  
But don’t just take my word for it. It is incumbent upon us to formally and informally test 
these plans ourselves. Informally, that means trying these out in your daily life. See if they help. 
Whether they do or don’t help, talk to someone you know about your personal experiment. 
Maybe find an if-then-planning buddy to share your intentions and experiences with. Or, if you 
yourself are a budding social scientist, then do a study on if-then plans! If you’re a computer-
coding entrepreneur, found a start-up company around an if-then planning app!  
As you read through the tools to follow, think about examples of if-then plans that might 
help you put these tools into practice. You might also consider ways to “gamify” these tools. Are 
there fun games or apps that might be designed which can help us practice using these tools? 
 
Tool #2: Approach Mindsets 
 
The mindsets we take into our social interactions are essential for shaping how we get along, and 
whether we act in biased or unbiased ways. One study examined the different mindsets we might 
have when meeting or collaborating with someone from a different social group (e.g., a different 
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political party, religion, or, in this case, a different race). One group was given the goal to “avoid 
appearing prejudiced in any way during the interaction.” This is an avoidance or prevention-
focused mindset, where people focus on what not to do. People in this group had more difficult 
interactions and were more mentally drained after the conversation. Another group, however, 
was encouraged to adopt an approach or promotion-focused mindset: “approach the interaction 
as an opportunity to have an enjoyable intercultural dialogue” (Trawalter and Richeson, 2006, p. 
409). People in this group found intergroup contact to be “rewarding rather than depleting” 
(411). Having an approach orientation makes conversations more likely to start off on the right 
foot and unfold in positive ways. 
Approach mindsets have also been studied in clinical and habit-training contexts. For 
example, studies suggest that people with alcohol use disorder who (in conjunction with regular 
rehabilitative therapy) repeatedly practiced approaching non-alcoholic drinks and avoiding 
alcoholic drinks were less likely to relapse for at least one year (Eberl et al., 2013). Other studies 
find that simply telling participants that they are about to approach members of a different social 
group, or to approach healthy foods, has many of the same benefits as repeated practice, 
including reducing bias on the IAT (Van Dessel et al., 2017). In general, when we like 
something, we tend to approach it. These findings further suggest that when we practice or 
imagine approaching something, we also come to like it a bit more, too.  
 
Tool #3: Common-Ground Mindsets  
 
Every person has countless similarities and differences with everybody else, but which 
similarities and differences count? Which ones do we notice in day-to-day life? When people 
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meet a member of a noticeably different social group, they are more likely to look for and notice 
their differences than to pick up and build on what they share in common. Another potentially 
powerful mindset regards trying to find common ground when you meet a new person—even 
over something as trivial as whether you both prefer apples over oranges, or carpet over 
hardwood floors (Mallett et al., 2008). Are you both rooting for the same contestant on The 
Bachelorette, or against that team that seems to win the championship every year? Do you both 
see The Dress as black-and-blue or blue-and-gold? The effects of common-ground mindsets may 
be even stronger for more “self-revealing” questions, like the ones that come up in Would You 
Rather?. Would you rather a) be granted the answer to three questions or b) be granted the ability 
to resurrect one person (West et al., 2014)?  
 With research like this in mind, Gehlbach and colleagues (2016; cf. Cortland et al., 2017; 
Robinson et al., 2019) had high school students and their teachers fill out a “get-to-know-you” 
survey with questions like, “If you could go to one sporting event, which of the following would 
you go to?” or “What do you do to de-stress?” Some teacher-student pairs learned what they had 
in common (e.g., maybe both would choose to go to the FIFA World Cup soccer finals, or maybe 
both de-stress by going for a walk). Compared to a control group that did not learn any shared-
in-common facts, the intervention led to increased perceptions of similarity between instructors 
and students. It also boosted student achievement, especially for black and Latinx students who 
were traditionally underserved at the school. Strategies for promoting mindsets of common 
ground across group differences represent key avenues for future research. If you, dear reader, 
are a college instructor or student, maybe you can try this strategy out at your next meeting in 




Tool #4: The Power of Perspective 
 
Part of what makes approach and common-ground mindsets effective is their ability to prompt 
perspective-taking across group boundaries. It’s easier for members to understand, communicate, 
and collaborate on shared social and political projects when they are able to see things from each 
other’s point of view. And it can be that much harder to take another’s perspective when people 
differ in some obvious way, like geographical origin, religion, nationality, or (dis)ability. Face-
to-face cooperation (see structural reform #4, below) remains the gold standard for promoting 
perspective-taking, but narratives and games are also useful here (see also structural reform #3). 
Community activists and scholars across the humanities and many social sciences have long 
emphasized the transformative power of narrative, and the empirical evidence bears them out. 
One study tested the effects of a twenty-minute, online “choose-your-own-adventure” game, in 
which Hungarians in their mid-20s occupied the perspective of an individual in the Hungarian 
Roma minority (Simonovits et al., 2018). Both immediately after the game and at least one 
month later, participants reported much less anti-Roma prejudice, as well as less prejudice 
toward another social group (refugees) who were not mentioned in the game. Participants were 
even 10% less likely to intend to vote for Hungary’s far-right white-supremacist party.  
Another study found that fictional, engaging narratives about intergroup contact and 
conflict can reduce explicit bias among young kids, high schoolers, and even undergraduates (in 
this case, students read passages about relations between Harry Potter’s wizarding community 
and “Muggles,” i.e., ordinary humans) (Vezzali et al., 2015). Perspective-taking interventions 
even reduce implicit bias, and lead, in turn, to more positive face-to-face interactions (Todd et 
al., 2011). Consider also that mock jurors encouraged to adopt the perspective of defendants 
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become less likely to find them guilty (Skorinko et al., 2014). See also McHugh and Davidson’s 
discussions of “epistemic friction” and “world-traveling” (Chapter 7, “Epistemic Responsibility 
and Implicit Bias”). 
 
Tool #5: Persuasion and Value 
 
But what does it actually mean to try to occupy another’s perspective? Which part of others’ 
perspectives should we try to occupy? Most perspective-taking interventions focus on imagining 
how other people experience the world (e.g., imagining what it’s like to be in the Roma 
minority), but research suggests that people from different backgrounds also tend to emphasize 
different sorts of ethical and political values when they reason about what to do (Feinberg and 
Willer, 2015). This poses a problem for moral dialogue because each group tries to persuade the 
other in terms of the values they prioritize the most, rather than in terms of the values most 
salient to the person they’re talking to. For example, left-leaning folks (e.g., typical “liberals” or 
“Democrats”) tend to put a little more emphasis on fairness, reciprocity, and protecting the 
marginalized from harm, whereas right-leaning folks (e.g., “conservatives” or “Republicans”) 
tend to place a bit more emphasis on patriotism, loyalty, and purity.  
With this in mind, one useful task for enhancing perspective-taking and finding common 
ground may be to identify the moral values most central to the person you’re talking to, and think 
about how to defend your goals in terms of those values. For example, a left-leaning person 
trying to persuade a right-leaning person to support marriage equality for everyone regardless of 
gender and sexual orientation might say, “Our fellow citizens of the United States of America 
deserve to stand alongside us, deserve to be able to make the same choices as everyone else 
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can… Our goal as Americans should be to strive for that ideal. We should lift our fellow citizens 
up, not bring them down” (Feinberg and Willer, 2015, p. 2). Right-leaning folks might better 
persuade left-leaning folks to support military spending by emphasizing its employment 
prospects for members of underemployed groups, including racial minorities, and explaining that 
“through the military, the disadvantaged can achieve equal standing and overcome the challenges 
of inequality and poverty” (p.7). 
Some people (in particular, pristinely principled philosophers and other academics) find 
this strategy unbecoming. It can sound cynical and manipulative. Shouldn’t we defend the right 
policies for the right reasons—the reasons we truly stand behind—rather than exploit rhetorical 
techniques that we don’t actually agree with in order to get others to think and do what we want? 
This is a reasonable concern! There may also be unintended consequences of relying too heavily 
on strategies like this. For example, appealing to concerns about purity might be useful for 
someone trying to persuade others to care about the environment and healthcare (“Keep our lakes 
and rivers pure and unpolluted!... Keep our fellow citizens free from infection and disease!”), but 
problematic in other contexts. Purity has historically been at play in some of our worst racist 
impulses, from laws against “miscegenation” (interracial partnering) to the rhetorical strategies 
used to justify genocide, which portray the outgroup as an infestation of diseased, polluting 
insects that must be exterminated to preserve the ingroup’s purity. Left-leaning folks may be 
understandably reluctant to let appeals to purity move back to the center of contemporary 
political discourse. 
So if we try this strategy, we must do so carefully. But before rejecting it altogether, we 
should remember that making genuine headway toward improving intergroup communication 
and perspective-taking likely cannot just be about imagining others’ experiences (e.g., imagining 
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“what it’s like” for both police officers and black civilians to fear for their safety). It must surely 
also include a central role for taking each other’s deeply felt values into account. Trying to 
identify the laws and policies that appeal to the widest range of people, because these laws can 
be defended in light of the broadest range of values, may be vital for bridging contemporary 
partisan divides.  
 
Tool #6: Accentuate the Situation 
 
As I write this, four of the American National Football League’s (i.e., NFL’s) thirty-two starting 
punters are from Australia (http://www.espn.com/nfl/players/_/position/p, 2018), as are many 
punters on American college teams (Bishara, 2018). Punters are highly specialized players who 
kick the ball both really far and with impressive accuracy to specific spots on the field. All the 
other punters are from the United States. Isn’t it odd that Australians, who don’t grow up playing 
American football, are making it in the NFL in this dedicated role? Why might this be? If we 
tried to explain this odd phenomenon by appealing to internal and individual factors, we might 
hypothesize that, since Australians are descended from British criminals, maybe they’ve 
inherited genes for physical strength or psychological grit. Maybe they have strong legs from 
outrunning the law or hopping after kangaroos? Or maybe not! 
The real explanation is not about Australian players’ genes or personality traits. It’s about 
Australian players’ situations, growing up in a country where “Aussie rules football,” a game 
similar to rugby, is very popular. This sport also involves kicking long distances, in a similar 
way to American football (which itself grew out of rugby). Of course, the fact that this highly 
specific skill is valued in two distinct cultural contexts doesn’t by itself explain why sure-footed 
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Aussies would abandon the game they love to learn a new one. What else is involved? How 
about the fact that Australians can make up to five times more money in the US and play 
professionally perhaps twice as long (“Australians in American football,” 2018)? Once we 
consider their situations, there is nothing particularly idiosyncratic or odd about their choices. 
We don’t have to appeal to any stereotypes about “Australian DNA” or “what Australian 
personalities are like” in order to explain their success in the NFL. 
 Too often we overlook situational factors and overplay individual factors when we try to 
explain things, especially when we are trying to explain the behavior of members of 
disadvantaged social groups. What’s worse, the individual factors we appeal to are often 
stereotypes. For example, both men and women are more likely to explain a woman’s anger in 
terms of her internal traits (“she is an angry person”, “she is out of control”), but, when the very 
same reaction is exhibited by a man, people explain it in terms of his situation (“he is justifiably 
angry given the circumstances”) (Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008). 
 So when we try to understand others, we do well to consider whether we are explaining 
their behavior in terms of internal traits or situational forces (Levontin et al., 2013; Stewart et al., 
2010). Why did Jamal show up late to work? Is it because he’s lazy and doesn’t want to work, or 
because that city-wide power outage last night stopped his alarm from going off? Maybe his 
brother’s car broke down, which meant it fell to Jamal to drop his niece off at school. Why is 
Jamal acting uncomfortable now that he’s arrived at work? Is it because he’s got a challenging 
personality that doesn’t “fit” our office culture, or because of anxiety that his predominantly 
white coworkers will assume that he came late just because he’s black? Maybe he’s 
uncomfortable because he rode up the elevator with a white woman who nervously clutched her 
purse as soon as he stepped in. With practice, we can make headway toward shifting our default 
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orientation away from stigmatizing, internalizing explanations and toward accentuating the 
situation. 
 
5. Structural Change 
Speaking of redirecting our attention away from the idiosyncratic beliefs, feelings, and character 
traits that explain people’s decisions and toward the broader situations that frame these 
decisions, this chapter now turns to concrete strategies for transforming our social institutions to 
combat bias and promote fairness. These strategies are roughly ordered from less to more 
transformational and impactful—and, accordingly, from less to more controversial.  
 
Structural Reform #1. Decision-making criteria 
 
All sorts of decisions can be influenced by implicit bias: Which candidate should I vote for? Is 
this defendant innocent or guilty? Which grade should I give this essay? How much should I tip 
my server? Should I swipe left or swipe right (Hutson et al., 2018)?  
Yet our decisions are less biased when we make them on the basis of clear criteria. For 
example, one study asked participants to choose between two candidates for the job of chief of 
police (Uhlmann and Cohen, 2005). One candidate had extensive “street” experience (street 
smarts) but little formal education, and one had extensive formal education (book smarts) but 
little street experience. In addition, one candidate was a man, and one was a woman—and in 
different conditions they switched which was which. When the male candidate was street-smart 
and the female candidate was book-smart, participants reported that street smarts was the most 
important criterion for being chief of police, and recommended promoting the man. However, 
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another group had to choose between a street-smart woman and a book-smart man, and this 
group reported that book smarts was most important, and still recommended hiring the man. 
What’s going on here? Participants had a gut feeling about who was the right fit for the job (chief 
of police = man), and then they combed through the résumés to find something to “justify” that 
initial gut feeling. 
 Nevertheless, this particular story has a happy ending. In a further condition, participants 
were asked to identify in advance which criterion (street experience or formal education) they 
valued most for the chief of police. When participants had settled on their decision-making 
criteria ahead of time, the bias in favor of hiring a man disappeared. Sometimes, preemptively 
settling on criteria—and sticking to them—is enough to eliminate the effects of bias. 
 Sometimes, but not always. Just because you’ve got some criteria doesn’t necessarily 
mean they’re any good! You might be baking in human bias or injustices without realizing it. 
This is a problem as organizations increasingly rely on computer algorithms to inform decisions, 
like whom to hire and whom to let out on parole (Johnson, n.d.; O’Neil, 2016). Many think that 
if a computer made the decision, it can’t be biased, but everything depends on how we design 
these algorithms and what data we feed them. Algorithms, just like ordinary criteria, can make 
our decisions better or worse depending on how we use them. 
 We don’t need high-tech examples to make the point. Consider law school admissions, 
which rely primarily on two criteria: LSAT performance and undergraduate GPA. Historically, 
LSAT scores have been given more weight in admissions (60%) compared to GPA (40%) 
(Crosby et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2018). What’s problematic about this weighting is that 
women have (on average) higher GPAs than men, but they also score (again, on average) worse 
on the LSAT. In other words, this weighting builds in an advantage for average male applicants 
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over average female applicants. This is all the more troubling when we consider that women’s 
LSAT scores might be somewhat negatively affected by factors like stereotype threat and 
impostor syndrome (see Greene, Chapter 7, “Stereotype Threat, Identity, and the Disruption of 
Habit”), and given the evidence that neither the LSAT nor undergrad GPA actually predicts 
future bar-exam performance (that is, neither criterion correlates well with the exam that 
ultimately determines who becomes a practicing attorney). 
 Examples like this demonstrate the importance of revisiting and revising our criteria. 
(Maintain an experimental mindset!) One of the great benefits of criteria is how much easier they 
make it to collect and analyze data. When we make all our decisions based on gut feelings, it’s 
very hard to tell if or where are decisions are going wrong. Once we start relying on clear criteria 
(LSATs, GPA, etc.), we can see whether these criteria are actually helping us make the best 
decisions, or are unfairly stacking the deck for some groups over others. Then we can continue to 
tweak the criteria to make sure they’re treating everyone fairly and delivering the most accurate 
outcomes. One study of a large company revealed that women, people of color, and immigrant 
employees were being awarded smaller raises than white American men despite earning 
equivalent performance scores (i.e., despite meeting the same on-the-job criteria) (Castilla, 
2008). In this case, their decision-making criteria seemed OK but managers weren’t acting on 
them properly. Only by collecting data were they able to reveal this problem—after which point 
the company reformed its practices and has now all but eliminated disparities in raises (Castilla, 
2015).  
Part of what enabled this company to reform its practices was that working with clear 
decision-making criteria allows greater transparency for everybody involved about the reasons 
and procedures behind our decisions. Similarly, when teachers use a clear rubric for grading 
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essays, it’s easier to be more open and transparent with students about the reasons for their 
grades. Clear rubrics can also point students (or applicants for jobs, promotions, grants, etc.) 
toward the precise areas where there’s most room for improvement. Criteria also promote 
accountability. It is much easier to hold ourselves and others accountable for our decisions when 
we can justify them by reference to reasonable, mutually-agreed-upon standards. 
Another virtue of criteria-based decision-making and data-collecting is that this strategy 
is relatively uncontroversial. People who are skeptical of ongoing efforts to combat bias and 
discrimination, or who are concerned about over-correcting and think the world is becoming 
unfair to white men, might nevertheless be on board for working together to settle on decision-
making criteria. The goal here is to focus our attention only on the factors we deem most relevant 
for success, and bracket everything we think is irrelevant. That said, some criteria are more 
controversial than others. Which standards should universities use for admitting students, or for 
hiring professors? Should they only look at students’ GPA and standardized test scores, or 
should they also consider, say, an applicant’s demonstrated ability to overcome difficult 
circumstances, or to enrich the range of social perspectives on campus? Should hiring professors 
just be about easily measurable things like how many papers they publish or how often their 
papers get cited by others? Or should it count as a “plus” if, say, an instructor has a record of 
success in mentoring students who are the first generation in their family to go to college? When 
we are hiring a police chief, is book smarts or street smarts more important, or are they equally 
important? There are countless debates to have about these questions. A further benefit to having 
criteria is that they allow us to focus our discussions on which criteria we should use for making 




Structural Reform #2. Anonymous Review 
 
Another relatively uncontroversial tactic—which I swear by—is evaluating materials 
anonymously (see also Saul, 2013). Literally every time I grade papers, I am surprised, in two 
ways: first, by some of the outspoken students who are good at seeming smart in class but who 
evidently put less effort into their essays; but second, by the quieter students who blow me away 
with clear and insightful work. Simply put, the fact that I am surprised means that I’m biased. It 
means I have expectations. And those expectations can affect my grades without my noticing 
(Alesina et al., 2018; Carlana, 2019; Forgas, 2011; Harvey et al., 2016; van den Bergh et al., 
2010). It’s also, frankly, a relief to not have to think about these issues as I’m grading. This is 
speculative, but I think tamping down the salience of the author’s identity sometimes frees up my 
mind to just dig in and focus on the paper itself. 
 Academic journals and professional conferences are increasingly moving toward 
anonymous review, and some early results are promising. Anonymous review seems especially 
well-suited to reducing prestige bias, when people assume, for example, that a paper must be 
high quality because it was written by an Ivy League professor. Another potential benefit of 
anonymous review is its power to broadcast a commitment to fairness to all parties involved. 
Some studies find that white women and people of color become more likely to submit their 
work to top-tier journals after the journals have transitioned to anonymous review, partly because 
they come to have more trust that their work will be evaluated fairly and accurately, without bias 
(Stewart and Valian, 2018, pp. 391–397). 
Obviously, anonymous review is not always possible (see also Dominguez, Chapter 8, 
“Moral Responsibility for Implicit Biases”) At some point, you may have to meet the person 
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you’re evaluating face-to-face, so anonymity goes out the window. Even so, you may be able to 
incorporate anonymous review partially, for example, by reviewing some application materials 
anonymously (using clear criteria!) before the interview stage.  
Where it’s workable, anonymous review should again be a relatively uncontroversial 
tactic for those who are otherwise skeptical of efforts to address bias. Here we are not talking 
about giving any “extra consideration” to members of disadvantaged groups; we are just talking 
about how to maximize the chances that each individual essay or application is evaluated on its 
merits alone, rather than on less relevant factors like the prestige of their school. People who 
think they are already objective decision-makers might find anonymous review to be a nuisance, 
but they are less likely to protest that it’s unjust. 
Anonymous review may actually be more controversial among those already dedicated to 
resisting bias and injustice. This is because there are many facts that some people are better 
positioned to know than others (McHugh and Davidson, Chapter 7, “Epistemic Responsibility 
and Implicit Bias”), which means that sometimes we should take people’s social identities into 
account when evaluating their claims (Alcoff, 2006). For example, if I want to know whether 
English is an easy language to learn, it would make more sense for me to ask a non-native 
English speaker than a native English speaker. People who had to learn English as a second 
language will know more about this topic than others. It would also make more sense for me to 
ask a linguist who has dedicated their career to studying second-language learning than it would 
to ask, say, an astrophysicist, brain surgeon, or four-star military general who, although maybe 
very smart, has not specialized in this area. 
Rebecca Kukla applies this idea to the journal review process, arguing that, “knowing 
who wrote a piece is often important to assessing the value and meaning of what it says” (Kukla, 
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2018). Moreover, Kukla suspects that anonymous review is an essentially “conservative” policy 
that privileges people who write in a “mainstream” and “conventional voice,” and may 
disadvantage people with less conventional styles or more radical ideas. Kukla further suggests 
that reviewers will often “be able to tell or at least make a strong guess about [the author’s] 
identity. So the idea that anonymous review levels differences and removes biases is a myth.” 
Just as appeals to racial colorblindness sometimes entrench whites’ advantages over members of 
other races (Alexander, 2012), sometimes appeals to total ignorance of identity might further 
marginalize those outside mainstream identities or styles. 
 While anonymous review is certainly not a cure-all, a few points might be made in 
response to Kukla. First, we may misjudge how easy it is to guess an author’s identity (Goues et 
al., 2018), perhaps because we are more likely to remember our correct guesses than our 
incorrect guesses, and also to forget all the times we couldn’t hazard a guess at all. There are 
many contexts in which we are prone to overestimate our accuracy and abilities (Pronin et al., 
2002), and this might be one of them. Consider a similar but much higher-stakes context: one of 
the leading causes of wrongful criminal conviction is eyewitness misidentification (The National 
Registry of Exonerations, 2019). Many witnesses who think they can identify the offender turn 
out to be wrong when the DNA evidence comes in. Second, perhaps there are ways to 
incorporate Kukla’s valuable points about identity and knowledge without completely sacrificing 
anonymity. For example, an author might mention an aspect of their social identity when it’s 
relevant to their argument (e.g., “As an able-bodied cis white man, I think I am more likely to be 
believed by police officers…”) without completely blowing their cover and announcing their 
name. Although partial self-identification like this would open the door for some biases, it might 
nevertheless inhibit others (like prestige bias). Lastly, Kukla does not actually defend total de-
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anonymity; she argues that attention to identity should play a role only at certain specific 
moments in the review process. Defenders of anonymous review should be open to the 
possibility of mixing anonymized and de-anonymized stages in our decision-making 
procedures—with the caveat that precisely when and how to practice anonymous review is an 
open-ended, empirical question that we cannot conclusively settle on the basis of anecdotal 
experience alone. 
 
Social categories and hierarchy: Ingroup vs. outgroup, high status vs. low 
Decision-making criteria and anonymous review are structural changes for blocking the 
influence of bias. For other promising examples of structural changes along these lines, see 
Stewart and Valian (2018, chaps. 5–10) and Glaser (2014, chap. 8). They are vital first steps, and 
they can be defended on narrow merit-based and colorblind principles that resonate with people 
from a variety of social and political backgrounds. Putting them into place requires some upfront 
costs of time and resources, but once they’re in place, sticking to them is relatively easy. That 
said, their overall impact on bringing about a more just and less biased society is unknown. Note 
in particular that both strategies aim to work around our biases, leaving our preexisting 
prejudices and stereotypes in place but limiting their influence on important decisions. More 
substantial structural changes might aim to reduce or eliminate our biases altogether, or stop 
them from forming in the first place. With that in mind, we turn next to more impactful (and, 
correspondingly, more difficult) reforms. These will inevitably be more controversial, in some 
cases because they are explicitly color- or identity-conscious (which makes them more likely to 
trigger complaints of “reverse” discrimination against historically privileged groups), or because 
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they raise worries about objectionable forms of top-down “social engineering,” where elitist 
administrators boss us around and try to remold our hearts and minds.  
Figuring out how to uproot our biases requires understanding where they come from. 
Research on child development suggests that two of the most powerful factors behind the 
formation of implicit biases are ingroup-outgroup distinctions and status preferences (Dunham et 
al., 2008). From a very young age and continuing into adulthood (Axt et al., 2014), people tend 
to implicitly prefer ingroup members over outgroup members, and high-status group members 
over low-status group members (status is determined by factors like the group’s average wealth, 
power, and visibility in celebrated jobs and positions). Since white people occupy a higher-status 
racial group, most whites implicitly prefer member of the ingroup over other races. Things are 
more complex for members of other racial groups, such as African Americans: for some, ingroup 
favoritism dominates social status (so they implicitly prefer blacks over whites); for others, status 
dominates ingroup favoritism (so they implicitly prefer whites over blacks); and many have no 
implicit preference either way (almost as if their ingroup favoritism and status biases cancel each 
other out). 
It stands to reason that reforms for combatting implicit bias should be oriented toward 
disrupting these two major causes, by shifting widespread perceptions of the boundaries between 
“us” and “them,” and by supporting egalitarian reforms that minimize status differences. 
 
Structural Reform #3. Environmental Signals, Counterstereotypes and Representation 
One powerful set of tools for breaking down us-vs.-them dichotomies and status hierarchies 
resides in the cues and signals in our environments (Murphy et al., 2018; Vuletich and Payne, 
2019). What messages do our physical, social, and virtual spaces send about who does and 
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doesn’t belong, and who will and won’t excel? Even subtle cues about belonging and identity 
can have powerful effects on our biases, behaviors, and sense of identity. Recall a set of studies 
discussed by Nathifa Greene (Chapter 7, “Stereotype Threat, Identity, and the Disruption of 
Habit”). Students in high school or college were first brought into computer-science classrooms 
that were either filled with objects associated with science fiction and video games (Star Trek 
figurines and World of Warcraft posters) or decorated in a neutral fashion. Then the students 
answered a series of questions. Researchers found that being in the “geeky” classrooms 
dramatically reduced women’s interest and expected success in computer science, but had no 
effect either way on men. In fact, girls and women are up to three times more likely to express 
interest in computer science in the neutral room (Master et al., 2016). Studies like this highlight 
the power of situations and environments to “influence students’ sense of ambient belonging… 
or feeling of fit in an environment” (Cheryan et al., 2011, p. 1826). What messages are our 
environments sending about who “fits” in our neighborhoods, campuses, classrooms, offices, and 
dorm hallways? 
Consider also a study on how attending an all-women’s college affected undergraduate 
women’s implicit biases regarding gender and leadership qualities (Dasgupta and Asgari, 2004). 
Beforehand, participants were quicker to implicitly associate names like “Emily” with traits 
stereotypical of women leaders, like “nurturing,” but to associate names like “Greg” with 
stereotypically masculine traits, like “assertive.” After one year, these implicit biases vanished. 
The same study also found that attending a coed school had the opposite effect on undergraduate 
women. After a year at the coed school, most women’s implicit gender-leadership biases grew 
even more pronounced.  
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You might think the difference-maker was a more supportive atmosphere at the all-
women’s school. That’s not what researchers found. Evidently, the difference boiled down to the 
total number of classes that students had with women math and science professors, because there 
was a larger pool of women math and science professors at the all-women’s school. A closer 
look at the data showed that this was true regardless of which institution they attended. Women 
at the coed school who also managed to take a few math and science classes with women 
instructors also showed reduced implicit biases. Subsequent studies have consistently 
demonstrated that having a few role models “like you” can be very effective for increasing 
motivation, success, and belonging, and shaping implicit and explicit biases and goals (for a 
review, see Dasgupta, 2013). These studies reveal the debiasing power of counterstereotypes, 
exemplars in our social environments who buck our biased expectations.  
More broadly, consider audience’s profound reactions to blockbusters like Wonder 
Woman, Black Panther, and Crazy Rich Asians in 2017 and 2018, which prominently portrayed 
white women and people of color in a diverse range of counterstereotypical roles. Experimental 
and correlational studies demonstrate that exposure to outgroup members through engaging 
narratives can reduce bias, such as the effect of the sitcom Will & Grace on heterosexism 
(Schiappa et al., 2006; for a review, see Murrar and Brauer, 2019). In fact, an examination of 
long-term, population-level attitudes found that, from 2007 to 2016, the largest reduction in both 
implicit and explicit biases regarded biases against sexual minorities (Charlesworth and Banaji, 
2019). It is difficult to suppose that changes in media representation (including journalistic 
coverage of the marriage equality debate) did not contribute to this change. We should therefore 
demand more cultural, racial, and other kinds of variety in our media diets. We can also take it 
upon ourselves to create more original and counterstereotypical content. Become the writers, 
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artists, actors, journalists and video game designers who enrich our media environment, and 
expand our sense of what’s possible. 
 Unfortunately, the effects of seeing counterstereotypes sometimes differ for members of 
historically underrepresented versus historically advantaged groups. Sometimes whites perceive 
the increased prominence of people of color as a sign that whites are unfairly losing status, or 
they conclude that, if some historically disadvantaged folks can now become billionaires, CEOs, 
or President of the United States, that means that people of color in general no longer face 
serious obstacles (Alexander, 2012, p. 244ff; Wilkins et al., 2017). Given these predictable kinds 
of backlash, we cannot expect changes in environmental cues or media representation to do all 
the work (Madva, 2016). The empirical case for counterstereotypical cues may be better 
grounded in their power to provide possibility-expanding role models for members of 
disadvantaged groups than in their capacity to debias the advantaged. 
 
Structural Reform #4. Intergroup Cooperation 
Several of the individual debiasing tools listed above (such as 2 through 4, on approach and 
common-ground mindsets, and perspective-taking) are closely tied to a much broader and time-
tested strategy: positive intergroup contact and cooperation. The basic recipe for reducing both 
explicit and implicit forms of bias is to get people from different groups to work together toward 
a common goal. Perhaps the most famous case was the desegregation of the US military in 
World War II. Soldiers who served in racially diverse units showed much less racial bias at the 
end of the war than soldiers in segregated units. For discussion of these and other early findings, 
see Pettigrew (1998). More humdrum examples are diverse sports teams and first-year college 
roommates (Shook and Fazio, 2008). Evidence also suggests that racially diverse juries are both 
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more likely than racially homogeneous juries to consider an array of perspectives and to more 
accurately recall case facts and testimony (Sommers, 2006). 
 Bearing in mind the potential for backlash discussed in the previous section, a key point 
to emphasize is that simply thrusting people from different groups into shared cubicles, 
classrooms, neighborhoods, or nation-states is not enough. We need intergroup cooperation, not 
just intergroup conversation, and definitely not just intergroup physical proximity (Enos, 2017; 
Putnam, 2007). In some contexts, intergroup contact and proximity can heighten rather than 
dampen bias, for example, when members of different groups are competing against each other 
for scarce resources. Productive intergroup contact must be 1) frequent, 2) on terms of relatively 
equal social status, 3) organized around cooperating toward a common goal, and 4) sponsored 
by authority figures who enforce conditions 1-3 (Allport, 1979; Anderson, 2010; Pettigrew, 
2018). Think of the role that good team coaches (authority figures) can play in holding their 
players accountable for having frequent cooperative contact and ensuring that all players are 
recognized and valued for their contributions (thereby promoting relatively equal status on the 
team). 
 The challenge for all of us, then, is to constantly consider context: how can we structure 
our own social institutions to foster fruitful intergroup cooperation? In this vein, I often 
daydream about two sorts of initiatives. The first is a campus-wide team-based competition (e.g., 
a massive event modeled on pub team trivia, or a kickball tournament, or Assassin, or…?) in 
which all the different school clubs participate, but teams are composed of a mix of members 
from different clubs. So, e.g., some Campus Democrats and Campus Republicans would be on 
the same team, as would various athletes, members of the model UN, Chess team, Black Student 
Union, Muslim Student Association, and Queer Student Alliance. The second initiative I 
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envision is a large-scale American “domestic exchange program,” in which high school students 
across the country spend one semester at another school in a very different situation, traveling 
between the center of the country and the coast, between north and south, between urban and 
rural, and so on. What would the world look like if everyone residing in the United States made a 
more concerted effort to learn face-to-face how the other half—or at least a few of the many, 
many other halves—live? 
 Some argue that we should make intergroup cooperation a central organizing principle 
for society, and strive to create racially integrated schools, businesses, residential neighborhoods, 
and voting districts (Adams, 2006; Anderson, 2010, chap. 6). Doing so might promote intergroup 
cooperation as well as ensure that that members of otherwise marginalized groups have access to 
the same high-quality education, healthcare, and job opportunities as members of more 
advantaged groups. In this way, proactive integrationist strategies have the potential to tackle the 
two major causes of implicit bias mentioned earlier: expanding our sense of who’s “inside our 
group” and limiting the influence of inherited and unjust inequalities in social status. 
 However, it’s one thing when an individual freely chooses to seek out more opportunities 
for productive intergroup cooperation; it’s another thing when schools, businesses, and 
governments enforce top-down policies to integrate their citizens or subordinates. Shouldn’t 
individuals have freedom of association, e.g., the ability to freely choose where to live and whom 
to befriend? One prominent strategy for promoting neighborhood integration is for the 
government to distribute vouchers which individuals can then use toward a down payment on a 
house, but only for houses in socioeconomically diverse communities. Some object to this policy 
on the grounds that it unfairly restricts people’s choices (they say it’s paternalistic), and because 
it is a conditional rather than unconditional distribution of goods (Goetz, 2018; Shelby, 2016; cf. 
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Madva, 2019a). If we take seriously that folks who live in concentrated poverty, such as urban 
ghettos, are denied the same access to the educational, healthcare, and employment opportunities 
available to residents of wealthy suburbs, then just devoting our efforts toward distributing one-
way tickets out of the ghetto might seem problematic. Does it, in effect, amount to telling these 
folks that their neighborhoods and schools are beyond saving, and getting access to decent 
resources and opportunities requires uprooting their households, leaving behind their social 
networks, and moving away from services that cater to their distinctive needs and preferences 
(such as religious centers or hair salons)? What about the ghetto residents who would rather stay 
put, and what about the hostility or discrimination that those who move might face from new 
neighbors who don’t want them there? One of the perennial obstacles to top-down initiatives to 
promote intergroup contact is the resistance of the advantaged, such as through “white flight.” 
Historically, a prominent strategy for racially integrating schools in residentially segregated areas 
was to bus students across town. When these busing policies were put in place, many wealthy 
white parents just sent their kids to private school rather than let them share classrooms with less 
privileged children of color. (This trend was as common in Boston, Massachusetts as in 
Birmingham, Alabama.) Productive intergroup cooperation is a powerful intervention, but 
creating conditions for it that are both effective in durable ways and fair to everyone involved has 
proven difficult. Some conclude that we should think less about integrationist strategies, which 
aim to move people to resources, and focus more on redistributive strategies, which move 




Structural Reforms #5. Powers to the Peoples  
Thus a final set of structural reforms tries to “cut to the chase” and focus on directly alleviating 
status hierarchies and inequalities rather than on breaking down psychological “us” vs. “them” 
dichotomies. These proposals are so varied that it is a disservice to lump them all together, but it 
is nevertheless worthwhile to draw readers’ attention to a wider range of questions about how 
best to overhaul society. 
 First, consider ways to make the distribution of goods fairer. Some overhauls that might 
help to mitigate status differentials in society are universalistic and colorblind: guarantee 
everyone free healthcare, a basic income (Matthews, 2017), and better financial support for 
students all the way through college and grad school (Miller and Flores, 2016). Such proposals 
are seen as radically left-wing in the United States of 2019, but some are common and 
uncontroversial in other parts of the world. (For discussion of these and other proposals that 
would apply to everyone but likely have the most positive effects on the most oppressed, see 
(Movement for Black Lives, n.d.).) Others argue that more targeted, color-conscious 
redistributions to members of disadvantaged groups are necessary, such as reparations for past 
injustices. For an accessible introduction and back-and-forth about the virtues and vices of taking 
racial reparations seriously—not just for slavery but for the many injustices that have continued 
since, see Coates (2014a), Williamson (2014), and Coates (2014b).  
A different set of tools for combating status disparities has less to do with making sure 
that goods like healthcare and education are equally available to all, and more to do with the 
well-functioning of democracy—in overtly political contexts but also more broadly in 
workplaces and classrooms. Note, for example, that most workplaces have a strong hierarchical 
structure, a top boss with nearly unlimited power to hire and fire whom they please, to force 
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employees to work long hours in unpleasant conditions, and so on. In response, some call for 
movement toward greater workplace democracy (Anderson, 2017; Frega et al., 2019). The idea 
is not for workers to vote democratically on every major decision. Instead, they might, for 
example, elect someone to represent their interests on the board that runs the company, or they 
might all jointly participate in deciding on the right decision-making criteria for getting 
promoted (structural reform #1). Defenders of these reforms argue that democracy is not just 
about “one person, one vote,” but about a culture of equals actively participating and sharing in 
the governing and decision-making processes of social institutions, including businesses, 
schools, and even families. Such reforms do not eliminate the distinction between leader and led, 
but they might reduce the perception that those in leadership positions are inherently “better 
than” while others are “less than.” That is, under these conditions, differences in leadership 
status would not entail differences in esteem or respect. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous 
section, getting people to cooperate on terms of social equality is key for reducing prejudice. 
Perhaps a similar lesson should be applied in disadvantaged communities. Malcolm X 
(1963) famously contrasted “racial segregation” from “racial separation” in terms of community 
control. He argued that America’s segregationist hierarchy was wrong not because it meant that 
whites and blacks lived separately (he disagreed that “separate is inherently unequal”), but 
because whites had an inordinate amount of control over black communities. His defense of 
“separation” called for more local control within predominantly black communities. The recent 
Movement for Black Lives has similarly called for more community control. Perhaps we should 
commit to redistributing resources to oppressed communities, but make sure that members of 
those communities have the democratic freedom to collectively decide for themselves how 
they’d like to use those resources (Goetz, 2018; Shelby, 2016). This would again be about 
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ensuring that residents of disadvantaged communities have the same status and respect as 
everyone else. 
While we’re at it, we might as well highlight broader reforms to promote well-
functioning democracy, such as, in the US, the elimination of the electoral college (Prokop, 
2016), reforming how political campaigns are financed (Kliff, 2018b), complex revisions to 
elections like ranked-choice voting (Nilsen, 2018), or redrawing political districts to prevent one 
side from holding onto power even when they lose the popular vote (Druke, 2017). Of course, 
for many of these reforms, the more impactful they’ll be, the harder they’ll be to set in motion 
and sustain. Returning more power to more people means taking power away from the elite few, 
and they don’t want that to happen. In fact, even among members of disadvantaged groups, it’s 
often difficult to appreciate just how unfair the current system is, let alone to mobilize against it 
(Jost, 2015). 
When it comes to more dramatic efforts to reduce power inequalities between historically 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups, color-conscious proposals like reparations or integration 
often face more backlash than universalistic and colorblind policies. But it is easy to overstate 
the disparities in divisiveness between colorblind and color-conscious proposals. Evidence 
suggests that many universalistic reforms, such as expanding healthcare access for all citizens, 
are often perceived by whites as delivering unfair benefits to people of color (Maxwell and 
Shields, 2014). Even basic views about the reality of climate change are increasingly predicted 
by our attitudes about race (Benegal, 2018). Our politics have become so polarized that a whole 
range of superficially non-racial political and scientific issues are thoroughly intertwined with 
beliefs and biases about race (and about gender and other social categories!). As a result, we 
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should be skeptical about the possibility of identifying major structural transformations that 
somehow avoid divisive backlash altogether. 
This returns me to a point I emphasized at the outset of this chapter related to Boxed Out 
and Leaving Mothers Behind. Some argue that, when it comes to bringing about a more just 
society, we should focus more on changing structures and less on changing hearts and minds 
(Mallon, 2018; Vuletich and Payne, 2019). But such claims repeatedly fail to appreciate the 
extent to which our hearts and minds prop up these unjust structures (Mandalaywala et al., 2018; 
Plaut, 2010; Ridgeway, 2014). Eliminating status differences between historically privileged and 
oppressed groups may reduce individuals’ biases, but eliminating individuals’ biases toward 
other social groups may increase support for measures to reduce status differences. More 
generally, if we want to change the status quo, we have to convince enough people that the status 
quo is unfair. So we have to examine the psychological precursors that lead people to get angry 
at injustice and animated to do something about it (Jost et al., 2017; van Zomeren, 2013). 
Structures change when attitudes change—and attitudes change when structures change… when 
attitudes change when structures change! Our beliefs, habits, biases and social structures are 
thoroughly interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Neither comes first; neither comes second; 
it must be both/and every step of the way. 
6. Conclusion 
Leaders have a powerful role to play in shaping how individuals’ interpret and respond to their 
own implicit biases. When authority figures send the message to their subordinates that their 
uncomfortable gut feelings are valid representations of social reality (e.g., telling straight people 
that the discomfort they feel toward gay people is justified), then vague implicit biases can 
transform into wholeheartedly endorsed explicit prejudices, and lead people to act in more 
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discriminatory ways (Cooley et al., 2015; Madva, 2019c). Leaders have the power to turn 
implicit biases into explicit prejudices and overt acts of discrimination. Such findings are 
disheartening when we think about people in leadership positions who stoke prejudice and 
division. But we can also respond to such findings as calls to action. The upshot is that we need 
to become leaders. Become the formal or informal leaders who demand change. Run for club 
president or political office, apply to move up the ranks at your job. When you get there, use 
your leadership status to broadcast your commitment to fairness and against bias. What signals 
are you sending by the policies you endorse, the opinions you respect, and the jokes you laugh 
at? How committed are you to fair, transparent, and shared decision-making and data-gathering, 
and to ensuring that everyone is treated with equal esteem and respect? 
 We don’t just need leadership in politics, business, or education, i.e., the contexts where 
specific individuals are granted official supervisory status over others. Making headway will 
require a whole bunch of leaders tackling these complex problems from a whole bunch of angles, 
from many different positions in society. (Patrisse Cullors, co-founder of #BlackLivesMatter, 
calls for a movement that neither anoints a single figurehead leader nor becomes wholly 
leaderless; the movement must instead be leader-full.) We need scientists to study causes and 
potential interventions, and we need activists and politicians to make changes. We also need 
artists to envision emancipatory alternatives. We need filmmakers and videogame designers and 
vloggers and science-fiction writers and journalists and therapists and lawyers and spiritual 
leaders. We need all the ingenuity, creativity, experimentation, and exploration we can get. The 
problem is so multifaceted, with so many different aspects to work on, that many people with 
many different strengths are necessary. Everyone can contribute, and contribute we must if 
meaningful, lasting change is going to come.  
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 We must also not forget that we’re the ones who have to make these changes happen. 
They will not happen on their own. Recall Martin Luther King Jr.’s warning about the dangers of 
believing that progress comes, slowly but inevitably, with the passage of time: 
 
Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational 
notion that there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. 
Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More 
and more I feel that the people of ill will have used time much more effectively than have 
the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the 
hateful words and actions of the bad people but for the appalling silence of the good 
people. Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the 
tireless efforts of men willing to be co workers with God, and without this hard work, 
time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time 
creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. (King Jr., 1963) 
 
Recommendations for Further Reading 
Please see published version for reading recommendations 
Discussion questions 
Please see published version for discussion questions 
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